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In this paper we present an alternative bio-epistemological-based approach to 
economic ethics issues, which suggests that economists need not only an 
understanding of the ecosystem in terms of irreversibility, but even more an 
understanding of the way the process in ecosystem make actual the principle of 
ameliorative equilibration. This means that among many technological innovations that 
extend the field of the possibilities only those that prove to be integrative and able to 
ameliorate the adaptation process will be chosen and preserved. In our view, only this 
type of prospective approach could be considered ethical as it realizes the principle of 
ameliorative equilibration and harmonizes the technological innovation process with 
the process of the ecosystem. 
Keywords:  social cooperation, biophysical constraints, negentropic rocess, 
ameliorative equilibration, vection, cross-disciplinary research. 
JEL classification: A11, B59, Q56, Q57 
Overview 
According to conventional wisdom, economic activity is part of society, and therefore, 
the economic actions of people are subject to ethical rules and can be evaluated from 
the moral point of view, just as any other human activity can be so evaluated. There is 
hardly an ethical problem, in fact, without its economic aspect; human daily ethical 
decisions are in the main economic decisions, and nearly all people’s daily economic 
decisions have, in turn, an ethical aspect. Ethical conclusions cannot be arrived at 
independently of, or in isolation from, analysis of the economic consequences of 
institutions, principles, or rules of action. Ethics and Economics are intimately related, 
as both of them study human action, choices, and valuation, though from different 
points of view. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, particularly during the last 
decades, research works situated at the interface between Economics and Ethics 
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have proliferated and a new field, Economic (Business) Ethics, has emerged. It is now 
a firmly established field, defined by a set of interrelated problems with which it deals. 
In fact, Economic Ethics typically involves four main kinds of activities [De George, 
1986, pp.18-19]. The first is the applying of general ethical principles to particular 
cases or practices in business. The second kind of activity is metaethical: investigation 
of whether moral terms that are generally used to describe individuals and the actions 
they perform can also be applied to organizations, corporations, businesses, and 
other collective entities. A third conventional activity of Economic Ethics is the analysis 
of the presuppositions - both moral presuppositions and presuppositions from a moral 
point of view - of economic activity. Fourthly, it deals with macro-moral issues, such as 
whether rich countries have any moral obligations to poor countries or transnational 
corporations to host countries. In brief, the traditional approach to Economic Ethics 
suggests that this field can help people address moral issues in business more 
systematically, and with better tools than they might otherwise use. 
The Conventional Morality-Based Approach to Economic Ethics 
For conventional researchers in Economic Ethics, ethical rules, judgments, and 
propositions are attempts to answer the question: what is the best thing to do? As all 
human action is undertaken in order to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs 
for a less satisfactory state, the ethical conduct is the conduct considered likely to lead 
to the most satisfactory situation in the long run. But, to say that people seek to 
maximize their satisfaction in the long run is only another way of saying that they seek 
to maximize their happiness and well-being (In its broadest sense, happiness is 
synonymous with the greatest possible harmonization and satisfaction of human 
desires). Accordingly, for standard ethical economists, the morality of human 
(economic) actions can be judged by their tendency to promote long-run 
happiness and well-being. 
It follows that the conventional approach to Economic Ethics can be fitted into several 
very broad classifications, namely [Hazlitt,1990, pp.166-167]: 
•  it is eudaemonic, because it regards the end of economic action as the 
promotion of the greatest happiness and well-being in the long run; 
•  it is teleological, because it judges economic actions or rules of action by the 
end they tend to bring about, and defines “right” actions as actions that tend to 
promote “good” ends; 
•  it is utilitarian, insofar it holds that economic actions or rules of action are to be 
judged by their consequences and their tendency to promote human happiness; 
•  it is also cooperative, as the broad purpose of ethical rules in economic 
activity is to harmonize human attitudes and actions so as to make the 
achievement of everyone’s aims as far as possible compatible. This purpose 
can be realized when these rules are not only such as to enable people to 
anticipate and to depend upon each other’s behavior, but when they promote 
and intensify people’s positive cooperation with each other. That is why, 
advocate conventional ethical economists, social cooperation can be 
considered as the heart of morality in economic affairs, and the means by 
which each individual can most effectively supply his own wants and maximize 
is own satisfactions. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
Consequently, the conventional approach to Economic Ethics appears to be an 
essentially anthropocentric one, as the content and scope of ethical judgments applied 
to economic activity are exclusively limited to social requirements and norms. In fact, 
the ethical limitations on economic activity as perceived by standard economics are 
basically social limitations (from reverse discrimination or truth in advertising to 
workers’ rights or trade secrets). By contrast, it seems to us that there is an increasing 
number of researchers who are now much more inclined to see economic activities 
and ethical judgments attached to them as being limited by physical factors, rather 
than by social ones. It is what we call the first radical reconsideration of the 
conventional Economic Ethics. 
A Non-Conventional Biophysical-Based Approach 
to Economic Ethics 
Over the last hundred years, economist remained attached to one particular idea, the 
mechanistic epistemology which dominated the orientation of the founders of the 
neoclassical school [Georgescu-Roegen/ 1975, p.347]. By their own admission, the 
greatest ambition of these pioneers was to build an economic science after the model 
of mechanics - in the words of Stanly Jevons - as “the mechanics of the utility and 
self-interest” [apud Georgescu-Roegen, op.cit., p.347]. 
The latter-day standard economists have apparently been happy to develop their 
discipline on the mechanistic tracks laid out by their forefathers, strongly fighting any 
suggestion that economics may be conceived otherwise than as a sister science of 
mechanics. The consequence of this indiscriminate attachment to the mechanistic 
dogma was the viewing of the economic process as a mechanical analogue consisting 
of a principle of conservation (transformation) and a maximization rule. The economic 
science itself was thus reduced to a timeless kinematics. 
To equate the economic activity with a mechanical analogue implies, therefore, the 
idea that the economic process is a self-sustaining, circular flow between “production” 
and “consumption” which cannot possibly affect the environment of matter and energy 
in any way. The obvious conclusion is that there is no need for bringing the 
environment into the analytical picture of that process. However, the crucial point is 
that the economic process is not an isolated, self-sustaining one. This process cannot 
go on without a continuous exchange which alters the environment in a cumulative 
way and without being, In its turn, influenced by these alterations [Georgescu-Roegen, 
op.cit., p. 348]. For the critics of mechanistic epistemology which dominates standard 
economics, actual economic phenomena move in a definite direction and involve 
qualitative change. At least, this is the lesson of classical thermodynamics. Therefore, 
the economic activity, like any other life process, is irreversible and cannot be properly 
explained in classical mechanical terms alone. It is thermodynamics - as already we 
have said – through the entropy law, that recognizes the qualitative distinction which 
economists should have made from the outset between the inputs of valuable 
resources (low entropy) and the final outputs of valueless waste (high entropy). 
The extraction of resources, their combination and transformation in production and 
their final disposal in the form of waste (or their recycling) results in a continuous  Ethical Mastery of Innovative Technologies 
 
−  Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting – 3/2006
  
29
   
change of the “orderliness” of the earth. The concept of entropy can be used to 
characterize the orderliness of a system: the higher the disorder the higher the 
entropy and vice versa. The extraction of a resource from a site with a high 
concentration and its final disposal into the environment, where a diffusion process 
takes place, increases the entropy of the system [Faber and Proops,1985, p.607]. 
One important implication is the fact that the entropy law is actually the taproot of 
economic scarcity; in the context of entropy, every action, of man or of on organism, in 
fact, any process in nature, must result in a deficit for the ecosystem [Paul 
Weiss,1970-1]. Another critical implication is that, given the entropic nature of the 
economic activities and processes, waste is an output just as unavoidable as the input 
of natural resources. “Bigger and better” economic products necessarily cause not 
only “bigger and better” depletion of natural resources but also “bigger and better” 
pollution [Georgescu-Roegen, 1972, p.18]. In this respect, it is worthwhile to mention 
that the last two decades witness the realization by many economists that economic 
activity has a biophysical underpinning that cannot be ignored [Faber and Proops, 
1985, p.599]. Thoben [1982] has suggested that the use of mechanical analogy in 
standard economics should be supplanted by the use of “organistic” analogy, 
recognizing that a complex economic system is more akin to a self regulating and 
developing organism than to a mechanical system. A similar exploration of organistic 
analogy is due to Fehl [1983, apud Faber and Proops, op.cit., p.601], who draws an 
analogy between economics and “dissipative structures”. In a similar way Hannon 
[1985] has argued for the analogy between economics and ecosystems to be 
recognized, with ecosystems offering the potential for an experimental systems basis 
for economics. 
The fact is that the debate over the importance of environmental and resource 
problems generated by economic activity caused many economists to adjust their 
conventional stance and come to accept that economic activity has a biophysical 
foundation, rather than a merely socially - conditioned one. Moreover, they came to 
understand that the economic activity of any generation has some influence on that of 
the future generations - as terrestrial resources of energy and materials are 
irrevocably used up and the harmful effects of pollution of the environment 
accumulate. For the non-conventional economists, one of the most important 
ethical economic problems for mankind, therefore, is nowadays the relationship 
of the quality of life of one generation with another - more specifically, the 
distribution of mankind’s dowry among all generations. Standard economics cannot 
even dream of handling this problem. The object of mainstream economics, as has 
often been explained, is the administration of scarce resources; but to be exact, one 
should add that this administration regards only one generation. For conventional 
economics it could not be otherwise: each generation can use as many terrestrial 
resources and produce as much pollution as it alone decides. Future generations do 
not exist, simply because they cannot be present on today’s market. And it would 
certainly be poor economics – for standard economists - to sacrifice anything for a 
nonexistent beneficiary. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the market mechanism 
cannot protect mankind from ecological crises in the future and cannot optimally 
allocate resources among generations, even if we would try to set the prices “right”. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
The only way to protect the future generations, argue the supporters of the non-
conventional, biophysical-based approach to ethical judgments in economics, is by 
reeducating ourselves so as to feel some sympathy for our future fellow humans in 
the some way in which we have come to be interested in the well-being of our 
contemporary “neighbors” [Georgescu-Roegen, 1975, p.376]. 
This non-conventional perspective suggests that economists need not only an 
understanding of environmental and resource problems from their biophysical 
foundations, but even more, an appreciation of the ethical implications attached to 
economic activity within a biophysical framework. Under such a new ethical 
orientation, the morality of the economic actions will no more be primarily judged by 
their tendency to promote long-run happiness and well-being, but rather by their 
tendency to refrain from “unnecessary” harm to the ecosystem. 
The Intermediating Role of Technical Change 
The biophysical view on ethical issues in economics represents, as already 
mentioned, a first major reconsideration of the standard economic ethics. This non-
conventional perspective is due to the realization by many economists that economies 
have a biophysical underpinning that cannot be ignored. They are concerned, in fact, 
about the biophysical limits to social activity, as follows: 
•  on the one hand, the problem of the irreversibility of productive activity and the 
constraints this places on economic activity in the long run because of finite 
exhaustible resources; 
•  on the other hand, the problem of how pollution may act as a physical limitation 
on man’s economic activity. 
For non-conventional economists, in the long-run biophysical limitations might well be 
binding. However, they argue, these constraints are likely to generate a social 
response which moves the economy away from the constraint, through technical and 
social adjustment. In the view of these economists, social transformation, technical 
change and biophysical constraints come together to form a web of recursive 
interrelationships, with technical change springing from the combination of social 
demand and the constraints on physical supply [Faber, Niemes and Stehpan, 1983, 
chapter 8; Faber and Proops, 1985, pp.608-609]. Therefore technical progress, in 
addition to its usual interpretation, has the important role of intermediating between 
social demand and the physically and technically possible. 
  These leads the above mentioned economists to conclude that it is not 
sufficient to look at social and economic activity solely with the concepts of standard 
economics and conventional economic ethics since this would ignore a major source 
of social change, namely technological innovation which springs from the 
biophysical nature of economic activity. In other words, in order to be ethical, 
human (economic) actions should refrain from “unnecessary” harm to the ecosystem, 
and this can be effectively achieved if technological innovation intermediates between 
social demand and biophysical constraints. That is, technological innovation means 
social demand adjustment to biophysical constraints by restraining from 
“unnecessary” harm to the ecosystem.  Ethical Mastery of Innovative Technologies 
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The Bioepistemological-Based Approach to 
Economic Ethics 
Conventional ethical economists remain attached to anthropocentric approach; 
insofar the content and scope of ethic judgments applied to economic activity are 
exclusively limited to social requirements. Their object study is the application of 
general moral principles to particular cases or practices in business, while social 
cooperation is considered as the heart of morality in economic activities. 
Consequently, the purpose of moral rules in economic affairs is to harmonize human 
attitude and action so as to make the achievement of everyone’s aims as far as 
possible compatible. All these explain why, for conventional ethical economists, the 
morality of human economic actions can be judged by their tendency to promote long-
run happiness and well-being. 
By contrast, biophysical economists are much more inclined to see economic activities 
and the ethical judgments attached to them as being primarily defined in terms of 
physical constraints, rather than in social ones. For these economists, the 
thermodynamic approach is a way for economics to get in touch with its 
biophysical foundations, while using the concept of entropy makes an economist 
aware of the irreversible nature of the time structure of many environmental and 
resource processes. In the context of entropy, every human economic action results in 
a deficit for the entire ecosystem, so that resource depletion and environmental 
pollution are unavoidable outputs. Accordingly, the principle of optimal resource 
allocation among generations gets a crucial relevance, and the ethical content of 
any human economic action can be judged by its tendency to refrain from 
“unnecessary” harm to the ecosystem. 
There is no doubt, in our opinion, that the approach proposed by biophysical 
economists represents a radical and beneficial reconsideration of the reductionist view 
promoted by conventional ethical economists. However, thermodynamics – with its 
concepts of irreversibility – is only a component process of the evolution and 
development of the Universe, in general and of the ecosystem, in particular. Recent 
authoritative research works in the field of physics and evolutionary biology suggest 
that in our Universe the negentropic processes complement the entropic ones. 
Accordingly, it is our conviction that a more integrative perspective is needed (we shall 
propose the self-organization approach) and a more elaborate founding principle 
has to be employed (we shall propose the ameliorative equilibration principle) 
[Piaget/1974 & Piaget/1976] in order to properly explain and understand the way 
ecosystem evolves and to better define the issues that Economic Ethics has to deal 
with. In other words, it seems to us that a second-generation revision of conventional 
Economic Ethics is needed. 
The Principle of Ameliorative Equilibration 
The phylogenetic, psychogenetic and sociogenetic systems operate according to a 
law of direction (called by biologists vection) which is the ameliorative equilibration. 
This vection is being realized by means of an evolutionary strategy which could be Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
summarized as it follows: introduction of a maximum of COMPATIBLE novelty 
with the conservation of the maximum of validated acquisitions [Weiss, 1970-3 , 
Weiss, 1974 & Piaget, 1974]. 
We won’t insist upon the functional reason of the vection as it is obvious that in all 
fields and at all levels the disequilibria play an important role since they require re-
equilibrations. 
From a structural point of view the main issue is to justify both functionally and 
inseparable dimensions: the compensation of disturbances, which trigger the 
disequilibrium motivating the search, and the construction of novelties, which 
characterizes the amelioration (i.e. re-equilibration). 
Unlike the organic assimilations and accommodations, which lay upon substances 
and energies necessary to conservate structures that continuously became more 
specific, the assimilation and accommodation at the cognitive level, extending these 
biological process, can constantly enlarge its field (that comprises larger sectors of 
reality, including the progressive world of co-possibles). This indefinite extension 
cannot be reduced to empiling because the specificity of the assimilation consists, on 
the contrary, of a genuine integration - that is, a game of establishing relations which 
entails the formation of totalities cyclically self closed.  These remarks lead us to the 
structural considerations. 
1.  The first reason that conditions the other ones is the feature of 
interdependence of the components of the entire assimilation cycle (beginning 
with the elementary schemes up to the formal schemes of sciences). When we 
talk about assimilation we necessarily refer to a previous system, irrespective of 
its rank, that is more or less solidly or durably integrated, this integration 
depending on such cycles. Otherwise the assimilation would be reduced to 
some accidental-empirical associations. 
2.  The second reason takes into account the fact that the fundamental factor of an 
epistemic equilibration is the conservative action that the totalities of the 
systems of any rank exercise over their parts to the extent that both   are 
accomplished. It is also true that this accomplishment is variable, hence the 
degrees of invariance: a stronger or a weaker stability depending of the new 
accommodations. But the action exercise by the totality is essential to all stages 
because it arises from the previous functioning of the assimilation and the 
conservation of the entire cycle, that is the parts’ subordination, is a sine qua 
non condition of the continuation of this functioning. 
Consequently, this power of conservation exercised by the totality is the 
supreme regulator that orientates every minute the local regulations of the 
parts. This is done as an imperative requirement: either the insertion of new 
assimilations and accommodations within the entire cycle became possible, or 
the cycle is broken and the system abandoned.  
3.  The third reason refers to the fact that the totalities elaborated as we described 
before never represent the final term. This is so because, on the one hand, the 
possibilities opened by the establishment  of its structure are virtual 
disturbances related to its current (present) state (which raise the  Ethical Mastery of Innovative Technologies 
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problem of the critical thresholds) and , on the other hand, due to the fact 
that the regulation of their functioning generate sooner or later 
anticipations which at their turn produce “réfléchissements”, hence new 
levels on which the actions or operations used as instruments  in previous 
structures become thematized object of thinking. 
The result of it is an enlargement of a structure, with to the extension of some 
variations in plus or minus and new morphisms between negations and positive 
features. The entire history of sciences reveals such a process of reflective 
abstraction which explain the formation of the new structures (totalities) starting 
from the previous ones. 
4.  The reflective abstraction (abstraction réfléchissante) [Piaget, 1977], 
responsible for the formation of new levels, is indissolubly connected to a 
reorganizing reflexion (abstraction reflexive) oriented towards more 
sophisticated compensations between negations and affirmations. Both the 
reflective and reflexive abstractions are jointly responsible for the sophistication 
of the process of regulation: if the first arises from what is called “prise de 
conscience” (J. Piaget), hence the thematization of previous operations, the 
second is in fact a new regulation grafted onto the previous regulation, 
which provides them a better guidance. The formation of the regulations of 
regulations  can be explained by the joint action of reflective and reflexive 
abstractions and not as a new factor introduced from the outside [Piaget, 1977]. 
5. The fifth reason leads to this apparently paradoxical result: each structure 
(totality) is backed upon the next one which realizes the possibilities opened by 
the previous structure (totality): indeed, if the regulator of the previous structure 
is the power of its totality as cycle, then the construction of the next totality is 
submitted even from its starting point to the necessity to preserve the previous 
one in its form of cycle, but extending it. 
In other words, the new assimilations and accommodations are simultaneously 
derived from the previous and the back-up of previous because they clarify them by 
completing them. 
Distinct from the return to a previous equilibrium, the ameliorative equilibration which 
unites indissolubly the constructions and compensations is not explicable only by the 
need to feed the scheme of assimilations (theoretically unlimited, but alone it could 
lead only to an accumulation of juxtapositions). The ameliorative equilibration consists 
of the fact that the forms of the previous structure (totalities) become, due to the 
reflexive thematization, contents for the superior forms and can be then completed 
with new contents thanks to this type of completive generalization which generates 
its own contents by combining and synthesizing the proactive, retroactive and 
justificative implications.  
The fact that these systems are based on the evolutionary strategy of knowledge 
acquisition means that the ameliorative products of the previous constructive cycle are 
integrated in the current (present) totality to form the initial object of the next cycle. 
It results from this that, on the one hand, the system is self constructive and “on the 
other hand that the constructions of the previous cycle become available for the next Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
cycle both as components for new constructions and as precursors (forerunners) 
submitted to an ameliorative reconstruction, the products acquired being also 
submitted to a continuous and selective re-evaluation which can at each cycle replace 
them. 
To sum up, the evolutionary principle of ameliorative equilibration can be expressed 
as it follows: the goals and the forms of the parts are compatible with the goal and the 
form of the totality. 
The Epistemological Precariousness of the Process 
of Technological Innovation 
Non-conventional biophysical economists have convincingly argued that social 
transformation, technical change and biophysical constraints come together to form a 
web of recursive interrelationships, with technical change springing from the 
combination of social demand and the constraints of physical supply. Therefore, the 
process of technological innovation has the important role of intermediating between 
social demand and the physically and technically possible. 
The point is that modern technological innovation process does not play such a role. 
On the contrary, there is strong evidence that most of the current technologies that 
dominate the productive processes in advanced countries conflict with the ecosystem. 
In our interpretation, the reason lies in a basic epistemological precariousness of 
the modern process of technical change. This precariousness consists of its serious 
deviation from the principle of ameliorative equilibration. This deviation means 
that the goals and forms of the parts (synchronic logics of the market, market 
fundamentalism
1) try unwisely to impose its hegemony over the goal and form of the 
totality (the evolutionary self-equilibration of the ecosystem, which sustains the human 
subsystem). 
The deviation from the principle of ameliorative equilibration takes the shapes of 
monotelism, fragmentalism, and reductionism. 
First of all, in order to properly understand the epistemological precariousness of the 
technological innovation process, a comparative approach between the engineer’s 
cognitive effort (who finds himself involved in economic process) and the biologist’s 
cognitive effort (involved in the study of the ecosystem) is worthwhile to be 
undertaken.  
The engineer is focused on a function which is supposed to become operational within 
certain artificial structure having a final economic utility, without paying attention, 
however, to the causal context
2 of both the selected function and the selected 
components needed for assembling the artifact. By contrast, the biologist starts his 
investigation from the study of some already synthesized superior (integrative) structures 
                                                           
1 We have in view the interpretation proposed by George Soros in The Crisis of Global 
Capitalism, Public Affairs, 1998. 
2 In our understanding, a causal context refers to the relationships between the function and its 
selected components, on the one hand, and the web of inherent, multiple and often 
imperceptible relations of the ecosystem.  Ethical Mastery of Innovative Technologies 
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and functions, in order to perform afterwards a functional decomposition, having all the 
time in view, across all decomposition phases, the totality (that is, the organism). 
Being conceptualized in such a way, the technology is subordinated to the end of the 
market subsystem, while entailing a causal chain which goes beyond the logics of 
market. 
It is what we call the monotelic feature of the technological innovation process. It 
consists of focusing exclusively on a single purpose (the mercantile logics of market) 
and ignoring both the ecosystem’s context and the consequences upon it. Missing the 
functional synthesis, as a necessary complement to functional analysis, the engineer’s 
performance is condemned to the fragmentation of problems and process he 
wants to address. In this manner, the avoidance of the multiple causality context – 
generated, in its turn, by the absence of functional synthesis – implies the unavoidable 
limitation to the market logics. 
Now, if we approach a more profound level of analysis, required by the self-
organization theory, we can better understand the epistemological precariousness of 
modern technical change process by means of a comparative analysis between 
technogenesis and phylogenesis. In this respect, the engineer places himself 
exclusively within a synchronic level, paying no attention to the fact that the 
synchronical stand he adopts is only a transitory moment of an indefinite diachronic 
process in time – in other words, of the evolution itself. A crucial difference between 
the functional construction performed by the engineer (that is, technogenesis) and that 
performed by the natural evolution (phylogenesis) comes to evidence, namely: 
•  on the one hand, within the engineer’s cognitive system, the representation of 
the function to be performed comes first to the construction of the structure; 
•    on the other hand, within the phylogenesis system, the stage of the 
construction of structures comes first to the stage of their selection. This 
selection is determined by the fact that the variant performs a new subfunction 
which differentiates a superior function of the organism or improves on already 
existing one, contributing in this way to the differential reproduction of genes, 
that produces it. 
The lesson to be learned from the comparative analysis between technogenesis and 
phylogenesis is the following: phylogenetic processes, to which the technogenetic 
ones belong, operate according to logics which say that goals and forms of the parts 
are compatible with the goal and the form of the totality [Leśniewsky, 1986]. In the 
living processes, there is a transitivity mechanism induced by the goal of totality 
(the organism, i.e.) upon the goals of the parts (the organs, i.e.). A different story is 
illustrated by the process of technogenesis, corrupted by a certain reductionism that 
is the conception that the effective understanding of a complex system (the totality) 
can be achieved by focusing on the properties of the isolated parts of that system. The 
implied presupposition of this reductionist view can be summarized as follows: the 
totality is the sum of its parts. However, life shows us that totality, irrespective of its 
rank, is more than the sum of its parts. 
In this way, the reductionist methodology so typical to the present-days techno-
corporative structures can be neither an efficient way of understanding the large 
natural systems to which these structures belong, nor an efficient way to harmonize 
them. Institute of Economic Forecasting 
 





   
An Exemplification of the Epistemological 
Precariousness 
Scientific revolution from the first half of the 20
th century turned modern Physics and 
Chemistry into sciences capable to influence nature on a global scale and to create, 
for the first time on earth, absolutely new forms of substances. 
For example, chemistry made remarkable strides (progress) during this period. 
Especially important for their effects on the ecosystem proved to be the knowledge 
acquired by the chemistry of organic compounds. 
The chemists discovered practical methods to create most of the molecular structures 
theoretically possible. The knowledge of the fact that the organic compounds’ variety 
is quite infinite and that the methods to realize most of possible combinations are at 
hand proved to be irresistible. As more knowledge has been accumulated about the 
chemical basis of some molecular properties types of molecular structures (that 
determine color, elasticity and resistance of a substance or its capacity to kill bacteria, 
insects and weeds), became possible to design new molecules with a unique 
purpose. These instruments, unprecedented as force and overwhelming as novelty, 
came into force as a result of market mercantilism (increase production under the 
pressure of demographic boom, hence increase consumption and profit). 
Only later, the vice with potentially fatal consequences of the new technologies 
applied in industries on large scale was detected. The vice was the lack of reference 
to ecosystem and the lack of connection with one of the discipline which largely 
contributes to its understanding - the biochemistry (the chemistry of natural living 
systems). 
The evolutionary biochemistry teaches us that the types of chemical substances 
existent in the living creatures and in ecosystem are a class more restraint than the 
class of possible ones. 
The reason of this fact is that each living creature and the entire ecosystem have 
benefit of three (3) billions years of “research – development – evaluation“of evolution. 
By differential reproduction and differential conservation the living creatures have 
acquired a complex structure made up of COMPATIBLE PARTS: those possible 
combinations between parts which are incompatible with the totality are eliminated. 
Therefore, the structures of the present living creatures and present ecosystem 
organization are the best solutions selected by the ameliorative equilibration of the 
phylogenetic system. This is true to such extent that any other form of organization 
would be undoubtedly unfit from the point of view of adaptation. 
A striking feature of the living – systems’ chemistry is that for each organic substance 
produced by an organism there is in nature an enzyme capable to decompose it. In 
this way the recycling interactions are made effective. 
But when men creates a new synthetic substance whose molecular structure cannot 
be founded in the  eco-system or deviates very much from the types existing in nature, 
there will not exist any degradative enzyme and the substance will tend to accumulate 
and  destroy the self-regulatory mechanisms of the  ecosystem.  Ethical Mastery of Innovative Technologies 
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The technological mutations – initiated by a conceptual and methological reductionism 
– are typical for the numerous substitutions of the natural process with the artificial 
ones. 
This reductionism injects a disjunction, a lack of coordination between the field of 
theoretically possible and the field of really necessary, ignoring the category of 
potentiality. 
As a consequence, any technological innovation derived exclusively from one 
discovery in a single discipline is meant from the very beginning to error and  failure 
because it ignores the fact that its application within the domain it defined trigger a 
chain of complex causal mechanisms at many levels of the reality. 
Some final remarks 
Our bioepistemological approach suggests that economists need not only an 
understanding of the ecosystem in terms of irreversibility, but even more, an 
understanding of the negentropic processes of the evolution. That is, an 
understanding of the way the processes in ecosystem make actual the principle of 
ameliorative equilibration [Laprieno, 1971]. 
The  cross-disciplinary approach (which synthesizes the horizontal coordination 
[Weiss/1970-1] between sciences with the vertical coordination of their 
epistemologies) and the multiparametric optimization method are able to exercise 
a negative selection against the nonintegrable and nonintegrative technological 
innovations.  This means that among many technological innovations that extend the 
field of the possibilities only those that prove to be integrative and able to ameliorate 
the adaptation process will be chosen and preserved. 
Only this type of prospective approach could be considered ethical as it realizes the 
principle of ameliorative equilibration and harmonizes the technological innovation 
process with the processes of the ecosystem. 
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